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The Role of Sensory Experience in Descartes’ Method
Miguel Vásquez1
Abstract. This article seeks to show that the role of experience in Descartes’ philosophy cannot be 
considered independently of his claims on pure intellectual knowledge. First, as a brief introduction, 
some passages of Descartes’ works, which highlight the importance of experimentation, will be 
reviewed. Then, the role of ‘common experience’ and sensation in Cartesian scientific explanation is 
shown. Finally, an explanation about the relationship between experience and reason will provide a 
general view on Descartes’ scientific explanation.
Keywords: Knowledge; science; Descartes; hypothesis; explanation; experience; phenomena; percep-
tion; sensation. 
[es] El papel de la experiencia sensible en el método cartesiano
Resumen. El presente artículo busca mostrar que el rol de la experiencia sensible en la filosofía de 
Descartes no puede ser comprendido al margen de sus afirmaciones en torno al conocimiento puramente 
intelectual. En tal sentido, enmarcados en este propósito, se analizan primeramente, a manera de 
introducción, algunos pasajes de la filosofía de Descartes en los cuales éste resalta la importancia de la 
experimentación en su propuesta. Posteriormente se busca mostrar el papel que Descartes le asigna a 
las llamadas ‘experiencias comunes’ y a la sensación dentro de la explicación científica. Finalmente, se 
ofrece una explicación acerca de cómo se relacionarían experiencia y razón en la filosofía del autor a 
fin de apreciar de forma general en qué consistiría su modelo explicación científica.
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cepción; sensación.
Sumario. I. The role of experimentation in Cartesian philosophy. II. Common experience and sensation. 
III. Relation between reason and experience in Descartes’ philosophy of science. IV. Is Descartes’ 
scientific explanation circular? VI. Conclusion.
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I. The role of experimentation in Cartesian philosophy
Most readers can easily recognize the main features of Descartes’ metaphysics, but 
the confrontation of his most known doctrines with the role of experience in his 
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conception of science is rarely undertaken and, by all means, it is not part of the 
traditional view of his thoughts. In fact, Descartes’ works, such as the Principles, the 
Discourse or the Dioptric, are filled with references about the role of experience in 
natural science. However, the author does not give a full explanation concerning how 
experience and ‘clear and distinct’ perceptions are related. With respect to this rela-
tion, Clarke says that Descartes’ effort is mainly focused in supporting the idea that 
science requires another kind of certainties different from those that metaphysics can 
offer2. Moreover, Clarke also draws attention to the fact that regarding Descartes’ 
interest in natural philosophy his works are mainly concerned with experience.
Hence, the role of experimentation in Descartes’ philosophy is mainly analyzed 
in the sixth part of the Discourse3 and characterized as an important resource in 
scientific explanation in some paragraphs of the Principles4. In those works, the 
author regards the importance of experimentation in natural philosophy in order 
to have a proper idea about phenomena5. According to this, Clarke remarks: “we 
cannot expect the same kind of demonstration in physics as in pure mathematics, 
and we will have to settle for something else”6. Hatfield backed Clarke’s observa-
tion saying that Descartes considers “lowered certainty”7 in his natural philosophy. 
Laws of nature (remarked in Le Monde8 and the second part of the Principles9) 
should be related to experiments based in common experience mainly qualified as 
merely probable. 
Regarding Descartes’ claim of including experiments in his philosophy, Garber 
says:
It is generally recognized that knowledge for Descartes is the clear and distinct 
perception of propositions by the intellect; knowledge in the strictest sense is cer-
tain, indeed indubitable, and grounded in the purely rational apprehension of truth. 
But it is also generally recognized that Descartes was a serious experimenter, at 
least in his biology and optics, and that in these areas, at least, he seemed to hold 
that knowledge requires an appeal to experience and experiment10.
2 See Clarke, D. “Descartes’ philosophy of science and the scientific revolution” in The Cambridge Companion 
to Descartes, edited by Cottingham, J. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 263.
3 CSM I: 143-144; AT VI: 63-65. References for Descartes works are abbreviated as follows: ‘CSM’ stands for 
Cottingham, J.; Stoothoff, R.; Murdoch, D. (eds.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2 vols. (Cambridge 
University Press, 1985). ‘CSKM’ stands for Volume three of the preceding, by the same translators and Anthony 
Kenny, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Roman numeral refers to volume and Arabic for page 
(e.g., ‘CSM I: 143’ refers to volume I, page 143). ‘AT’ stands for Adam, C and Tannery, P. (eds.), Ouvres de 
Descartes, revised ed., 12 vols. (Paris: Vrin/CNRS, 1964-76). Roman numeral refers to volume and Arabic for 
page (e.g., ‘AT VI: 63’ refers to volume VI, page 63). The titles of Descartes’ works are abbreviated as follows: 
‘Discourse’ for The Discourse of Method, ‘Principles’ for Principles of Philosophy, and ‘Meditations’ for Me-
ditations on First Philosophy (e.g., ‘Principles III: 46’ refers to article 46 of the third part of the Principles).
4 CSM I: 187-189, 256; AT IX B: 16-20, 101.
5 CSM I: 189-190; AT IX B: 20.
6 Clarke, D. “Descartes’ philosophy of science and the scientific revolution”, Op. Cit., p.282
7 Hatfield, G. “Science, Certainty, and Descartes” in Proceedings of the Biennal Meeting of the Philosophy of 
Science Association, Vol.1988, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1988), p.250
8 CSM I: 92-97; AT XI: 36-48.
9 CSM I: 240-243; AT VIII A: 62-66 (Principles II: 37, 39, 40, 41, 42).
10 Garber, D. Descartes Embodied, New York: Cambridge Univesity Press 2001, p. 85.
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In spite of Descartes’ search of clear and distinct perceptions, the author is also 
interested in developing experiments to prove hypotheses related to particular phe-
nomena. In this sense, Garber and the majority of contemporary readers concur that 
Descartes’ philosophy is not confined on itself, instead is open to the development 
of experiments in order to have an adequate idea about physics, dioptric and even 
medicine. In this regard, Garber comments that:
To the twentieth-century philosophers this looks a bit puzzling: How can Des-
cartes be both a rationalist, who sees knowledge as deriving from the intellect, 
and an experimentalist, who sees experiment and observation as essential to the 
enterprise of knowledge?11
According to the puzzle that Garber mentions, Descartes is also interested in 
acquiring intellectual contents as well as experimental knowledge. Thus, experi-
ments are designed to describe a particular mechanism in physics, while intellectual 
contents set the foundations of his natural philosophy. Likewise, according to Gar-
ber’s view, to qualify Descartes’ philosophy as rationalist, or even as aprioristic, 
will exacerbate the ambivalence between intellectual and experimental knowledge, 
and so will not depict Descartes’ interest in experience. According to this, the term 
rationalist cannot describe Descartes’ science, because, in spite of being based on 
clear and distinct perceptions, it is developed by using hypotheses to be confirmed 
experimentally12.
II. Common experience and sensation
Descartes’ scientific explanation attempts to explain physical phenomena in their 
most general form, according to natural laws previously conceived by the intellect13. 
According to this, experience is responsible to grasp specific details of phenomena, 
which are covered by general laws. That is, experience, guided by those laws, will 
lead us in developing further experiments. So, experiments should be designed and 
developed considering a wide range of common and simple experiences, as Des-
cartes states in the sixth part of the Discourse14. 
Hence, Descartes’ natural science spreads according to different kinds of certain-
ties (moral and ‘clear and distinct’); and, in doing so, the author shows that science 
11 Ibid.
12 Williams in Descartes: The project of Pure Enquiry, New York: Routledge, 2005 (first published in 1978) regar-
ded the ambivalence between reason and experience in Cartesian philosophy, pointed out by Garber paragraphs 
above saying that “Those who know Descartes only from the Discourse may have felt some surprise when after 
what at least seem like very extensive claims for the power of human reason to know the world around us, he 
makes in the sixth section an appeal for funds to support experiments or guided observations, and moreover 
gives a justification of their necessity in terms of the very richness and fruitfulness of his explanatory principles, 
something which without further interpretation seems scarcely to make sense”. Williams, B. Descartes: The 
project of Pure Enquiry, New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 242. The ‘additional explanation’ that Williams claims 
could solve the puzzle mentioned by Garber in which intellect has to face the challenge of relating clear and dis-
tinct perceptions (perceived by any intervention of experience), with ‘sensitive experience knowledge’ grasped 
by the intervention of the body.
13 CSM I: 240-243; AT VIII A: 62-66 (Principles II: 37, 39, 40, 41, 42).
14 See CSM I: 143; AT VI: 63.
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should work considering principled knowledge, as well as probabilistic knowledge 
(which is, at the end, the main feature of moral certainties). From common experi-
ence, intellect cannot grasp indubitable knowledge, but only probable certainty.
Thus, Descartes clearly attempts to show that science cannot be developed using 
intellectual certainties only; probable and hypothetical reasoning (called moral) is 
also needed in natural science. According to Clarke’s view, Descartes attempts to in-
troduce a new perspective in natural science, opposed to the scholastic standpoint15.
In this regard, considering Descartes’ view about the role of common experience 
relative to experimentation in natural science, Williams points that:
Descartes emphasizes, correctly, that experiments are use unless one has some 
insight into the nature of the problem (…). More elaborate and refined experiment 
can be actually misleading unless one has the right idea in the first place. One 
should start with common observation and reflection: experiments are both more 
necessary, and safer, the further on one is16.
However, despite Williams’ attempt to clarify Descartes’ view about the relation 
between common experience and experimentation, Descartes insists in the idea that 
experience cannot show anything, but features of res extensa previously described 
by intellect. In other words, Descartes says that intellect can only have a general idea 
about the whole nature using clear and distinct perceptions solely.
Accordingly, experience seems to be ambivalent because, on the one hand, Des-
cartes is claiming for experiments in order to explain natural phenomena and, on the 
other, he remarks that, before experiments and its hypothetical assumptions, intel-
lect can have a general idea about nature as a whole (considering clear and distinct 
perceptions related to attributes and modes of res extensa). In this regard, how can 
experience be associated with intellectual certainties? Before answering this ques-
tion, it must be taken in to account that Descartes’ conception of experience is based 
on the idea that intellect uses the body to know the features of matter. So, it can 
be said that, ultimately, experience is based on Descartes’ concept of sensation. In 
order to answer the question, it will be necessary to focus on Descartes’ concept of 
sensation, developed mostly in the sixth replies to the Meditations. There, Descartes 
distinguishes three different grades of certainties related to sensation17: (1) sensation 
as a capacity to affect our body; (2) sensation as a singular and differentiable mean 
(such as pain, hunger or any other) that makes reference to the union between mind 
and body; and (3), sensation as the object of the judgments done by intellect referring 
to what the senses perceived.
Regarding the third grade of sensation, Simmons18 introduces a distinction be-
tween ‘projective judgments’ and ‘constructive judgments’, where the former “are 
those by which Descartes maintains that we “refer” our sensations to the world or 
judge that there is something in the world that “resembles” or “conforms to” our 
15 See Clarke, D. “Descartes’ philosophy of science and the scientific revolution”, Op. Cit., p.275. 
16 Williams, B. Descartes: The project of Pure Enquiry, New York: Routledge 2005, pp.248-249 
17 CSM II: 294, 295; AT VII: 436-438.
18 See Simmons, A. “Descartes on the Cognitive Structure of Sensory Experience” in the Philosophy and Pheno-
menological Research, Vol. LXVII, No. 3. November 2003, pp. 549-579
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sensations”19 and the latter are those that “help to construct of the phenomenological 
representation of particular qualities in the first place”20. In this sense, Simmons says, 
“Descartes attributes third-grade judgments to the intellect, with the consequence 
that our overall sensory experience involves the joint efforts of sense and intellect”21.
According to this, common experience implies these different grades of sensa-
tions. Hence, common experience, founded in sensations, presupposes (1) that hu-
man body is affected by something (2) this affection produces a passion and then, 
(3) judgments based in that specific passion appears in order to offer an explanation 
about the cause of that affection. As it was mentioned above, Simmons states that 
those judgments can be classified as projective and constructive; the former is fo-
cused in showing possible similarities between affections and their causes, and the 
latter is focused in describing representations produced by intellect from those caus-
es. In this sense, the grade of certainty reached by common experience is moral or 
even less, merely hypothetical.
Thus, the idea that laws of physics rules the world should be related with the idea 
that sensitive knowledge cannot be considered as always being false. Moral certain-
ty, based on common experience, assumes an order in physics, which emerges from 
inductive reasoning. This order (later reviewed by intellect) should be considered the 
starting point of further experiments based in ordinary observations. According to 
this, common experience supposes (a) the idea that intellect is able to receive infor-
mation about facts; and (b) the ability to judge about those facts. Thus, experiments 
should be based on common experience; otherwise, they cannot lead to an accurate 
explanation about phenomena. For those reasons, it can be said that knowledge by 
effects22 is based in common experience, i.e., in sensation. 
However, in spite of the effort of showing the relationship between Descartes’ 
common experience and his notion of sensation (reviewed in the Sixth Replies), Sim-
mons’ distinction between projective and constructive judgments deserves further 
analysis that cannot be fairly dealt with in this essay. Nevertheless, the distinction 
between these types of judgment allows us to understand the third grade of certainty 
implied in common experience.
III. Relation between reason and experience in Descartes’ philosophy of science
In the sixth part of the Discourse, Descartes summarizes his view about scientific 
reasoning saying that:
First I tried to discover in general the principles of first causes of everything that 
exists or can exist in the world. To this end I considered nothing but God alone, 
who created the world; and I derive these principles only from certain seeds of 
truth which are naturally in our souls. Next I examine the first and the most ordi-
nary effects deducible from these causes. In this way, it seems to me, I discovered 
19 Simmons, A. “Descartes on the Cognitive Structure of Sensory Experience”, Op. Cit., p.553 
20 Ibid. 554
21 Ibid.
22 In this context, ‘knowledge by effects’ is synonymous of ‘knowledge by empirical observation’ as Descartes 
states in the Discourse. CSM I: 144; AT VI: 64.
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the heavens, the stars, and the earth; and, on the earth, water, air, fire, minerals, 
and other such things which, being the most common of all and the simplest, are 
consequently the easiest to know23.
The first part of the passage is mainly focused on justifying an aprioristic model 
of science grounded in intellect perceptions. That is, a model that explains phenome-
na, starting with clear and distinct perception and finishing with a general description 
about phenomena, based only on intellectual considerations. On the contrary, the 
second part states that particular phenomena are knowable by means of intellect per-
ceptions. In this sense, Descartes sets the idea that intellect knows the effects from 
their causes only (regardless of its relation with experience), meaning that his view 
can be categorized as deductive. According to this, intellect knows natural phenom-
ena through the laws of physics, previously grasped by intellect. This way of rea-
soning, featured by Clarke as aprioristic24, is mainly focused in showing that natural 
science cannot be developed regardless of clear and distinct perceptions. According 
to that view, Descartes seems to be convinced that natural science cannot be based 
in observation or experimentation only. In contrast, Descartes additionally says, in 
the sixth part of the Discourse, “Consequently I thought the only way of making 
these bodies useful to us was to progress to the causes by way of the effects and to 
make use of many special observations”25; this means that particular features of nat-
ural phenomena can be described considering experimentation; that is, considering 
experience. 
Thus, Descartes’ view shows that, on the one hand, scientific knowledge should 
be grounded in principles previously perceived by intellect and, on the other hand, 
that scientific knowledge cannot avoid common experience knowledge. According 
to this, Clarke (1982, 1992), Garber (2001) and Williams (2005) agree with the thesis 
that Descartes is convinced that the role of experience in natural science is critical. 
Despite the fact that laws of physics explain every natural phenomenon from a 
general standpoint, these commentators accept the idea that Descartes is convinced 
that experiments can be useful in order to explain particularities of natural phenom-
ena or even to confirm scientific hypotheses. According to this, Descartes’ natural 
science attempts to combine an aprioristic view (mostly based in merely intellectual 
perceptions) with experimental observations (based on common experiences). For 
this reason in the sixth part of the Discourse, Descartes says:
Reviewing in my mind all the objects that have ever been present to my senses, I 
venture to say that I have never noticed anything in them which I could not explain 
quite easily by the principles I had discovered. But I must also admit that the pow-
er of nature is so ample and so vast, and these principles so simple and so general, 
that I noticed hardly any particular effect of which I do not know at once that I can 
be deduce from the principles in many different ways; and my greatest difficulty 
is usually to discover in which of these ways it depended of them. I know no other 
23 CSM I: 143,144; AT VI: 63, 64.
24 See Clarke, D. Descartes’ Philosophy of science, Op. Cit., p.8 
25 CSM I: 144; AT VI: 64.
617Vásquez, M. An. Semin. Hist. Filos. 34(3) 2017: 611-622
means to discover this than by seeking further observations whose outcomes vary 
according to which of these ways provides the correct explanation26.
Descartes insists in the idea that his conception of science is not divorced from 
experience. Moreover, as the author suggests: in order to know the way in which 
principles can be related with particular phenomena, specific explanations (grounded 
in experience) are needed. Thus, before proving a hypothesis, several hypotheses 
that aim to explain a particular phenomenon should be considered as possible. In this 
sense, the paragraph quoted above remarks the need of hypothesis in the natural sci-
ence, which add a new reason to support the idea that the role of experience in Des-
cartes’ scientific reasoning is not secondary, it is rather essential, as it was mentioned 
paragraphs above. Hence, considering the amount of phenomena (as Descartes stated 
before), experimentation will be the only way to know the correct explanation about 
given natural phenomenon. In this sense, before proving which hypotheses fit into 
the laws of physics, several of them should be taken as valid in natural philosophy. 
Clarke says that natural science should be based in common experience. Thus, 
experiments must be developed in order to choose among different possibilities27. In 
this sense, experimentation can be featured as a complementary stage in Descartes’ 
natural philosophy, which fixes confrontations between rival hypotheses, comparing 
experimental results with general considerations about phenomena (such as the laws 
of physic), previously perceived by intellect. 
The discussion between rival hypotheses arises when experience is considered 
as a proper way to reach an explanation about given phenomenon; that is, when the 
idea that Descartes’ natural philosophy is aprioristic is rejected. Different solutions 
to a given problem in natural philosophy can be considered possible, whereas their 
relationship with metaphysical certainties, expressed through laws of physics, has 
not been proven yet. 
Nevertheless, despite Descartes’ effort to support the idea that experimentation 
is necessary in natural philosophy, We must agree with Hatfield in saying that it is 
difficult to admit that Descartes’ philosophy can be seen as empiricist28. Even Garber 
admits this difficulty when he states that “when the extent of Descartes’ dependence 
on experiment and observation is recognized, there is a temptation simple to think 
that Descartes must have been placed in the wrong slot, and conclude that he must 
really be some sort of empiricist”29.
In this sense, despite of the experiments’ success, the role of intellectual per-
ception cannot be avoided in Descartes’ physics, because experience is not able to 
judge, it can only perceive through senses; intellect decides ultimately between ri-
val hypotheses. According to this, Descartes’ natural philosophy starts with merely 
intellectual perceptions, and ends regarding experimental observations that fit with 
the former. Therefore, according to Descartes’ natural philosophy, to know the truth 
relies on the possibility of matching empirical certainties (also called ‘moral’) that 
arise from experiments with merely intellectual contents. The role of hypothesis in 
Cartesian natural philosophy reveals the meaning of the phrase ‘to explain the caus-
26 CSM I: 144; AT VI: 64, 65.
27 See Clarke, D. Descartes’ Philosophy of science. Op. Cit., p.189 
28 Hatfield, G. “Science, Certainty, and Descartes”, Op. Cit., p. 249
29 Garber, D. Descartes Embodied, Op. Cit., p.110 
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es from their effects’; which means to show empirical implications of intellectual 
perceptions. Explaining the causes from their effects means to develop experiments 
in order to know particular details about res extensa (e.g., to know what the distri-
bution of motions in the world actually is30). Furthermore, in the second part of the 
Principles, Descartes regards the role of experience in natural science by saying that:
The principles which we have so far discovered are so vast and so fertile, that 
their consequences are far more numerous than the entire observed contents of the 
visible world; indeed, they are so numerous that we could never —in a lifetime—
make a complete survey of them in our thought. But I shall now put forward for 
scrutiny a brief account of the principal phenomena of nature whose causes we 
must now examine. Our purpose is not to use these phenomena as the basis for 
proving anything, for we aim to deduce an account of effects from their causes, 
not to deduce an account of causes from their effects. The intention is simply to 
direct our mind to a consideration of some effects rather than others from among 
the countless effects which we take to be producible from the selfsame cause31.
To explain causes from their effects does not mean that those causes (laws of 
physics and its metaphysical implications) can be rejected from experience alone; 
since those causes are perceived as clear and distinct by intellect, they cannot be 
considered as being false. Hence, to explain a cause from its effects consist in deter-
mining, within a wide range of possibilities, which is the experience that expresses 
accurately what physical principles show. This determination cannot be done follow-
ing aprioristic considerations only, but by considering sensitive experience, i.e., the 
results of experimentation. Additionally, in order to explain the implications of the 
term deduce, used by Descartes in the quotation above, Williams says:
It is important to see here that to ‘deduce’ an effect from the laws of nature does 
not mean to arrive at a statement of that effect from the laws of nature alone by 
purely logical reasoning (which is what the modern meaning of the word might 
lead one to expect) (…) What Descartes means here by ‘deducing’ an effect is the 
process of postulating a mechanism for it within the constraints set by the concepts 
and laws of his physical theory32. 
According to Williams, Descartes is not trying to prove that experience opposes 
reason; on the contrary, experience cannot surpass reason. Descartes openly insists 
in that the idea that knowledge derives from experience is essential to natural phi-
losophy, because their principles cannot be threatened in any way. Moreover, Clarke 
assets that Descartes’ natural science was developed regarding two different kinds of 
certainties: moral, and ‘clear and distinct’. The aim of the former will be to decide 
between opposite hypothesis regarding experiment’s results, and the aim of the latter 
30 Williams, B. Descartes: The project of Pure Enquiry, Op. Cit., p. 256 
31 CSM I: 249; AT VIII A: 82 (Principles III: 4).
32 Williams, B. Descartes: The project of Pure Enquiry, Op. Cit., 249 
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will be to reach an intellectual view about reality as a whole. Moreover, Clarke states 
that:
The relevant point here is that, having decided which variables to attribute to mat-
ter, we cannot determine by similar arguments the values of these variables; we 
cannot decide a priori the number, size, or speed of the various small parts of mat-
ter which underpin the whole edifice of Cartesian physics. (That means, appeal to 
another mean as sensibility is required to grasp the value of matter)33.
In relation to this, in paragraph 46 of the third part of the Principles, Descartes 
expresses the need of developing experiments (i.e., explain causes from their effects) 
by saying:
We cannot determine by reason alone how big these pieces of matter are, or how 
fast their move, or what kinds of circle they describe. Since there are countless dif-
ferent configurations which God may have instituted here, experience alone must 
teach us which configuration he actually selected in preference to the rest. We are 
thus free to make any assumption on these matters with the sole proviso that all the 
consequences of our assumption must agree with our experience34.
In his works, Descartes does not mention experience in order to complement his 
scientific research in natural philosophy; he mentions it to show that natural phi-
losophy must always consider probabilistic knowledge. In this sense, according to 
Descartes’ view, to reach an adequate and accurate explanation about natural phe-
nomena, appealing to reason only, is simply impossible. 
Thus, Descartes asserts that causes explain natural phenomena from a general 
point of view regarding indubitable truths, and that effects explain natural phenome-
na from a particular point of view regarding moral certainties. So, to explain causes 
from their effects means that a general standpoint, established by laws of physics 
(perceived regardless experience), can be described as appealing to experiments 
grounded in common experience. Hence, Descartes suggests, in the Principles, that 
explanations about particular phenomena must be developed in order to describe 
what the implications of these laws are in the different areas of natural science (such 
as geology, astronomy and even medicine).
In this regard, scientific explanation in Descartes’ philosophy cannot be featured 
as aprioristic, at least in a strong way. This view is supported by the role of experi-
mentation and hypothesis in his natural philosophy. According to Descartes, previ-
ous knowledge about the causes of phenomena are needed in order to have an idea 
about how the world is ordered, but hypothesis and experiments are also needed in 
order to know which specific effects can be deduced from those causes. 
Nevertheless, despite of his interest to settle natural science in intellectual percep-
tions, and his effort for include experience in natural philosophy; the question about 
how those different types of explanations (from the causes to their effects, and from 
33 Clarke, D. “Descartes’ philosophy of science and the scientific revolution”, Op. Cit., p.263.
34 CSM I: 100,101; AT VIII A: 256, 257 (Principles III: 46).
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the effects to their causes) can be related still remains. Now, we must attend to how 
these two sorts of explanation can be related.
IV. Is Descartes’ scientific explanation circular?
According to what has been explained in the paragraphs above, it seems that Des-
cartes is accepting that both types of explanation, from the causes to the effects and 
from the effects to the causes, are possible. However, Jean Baptiste Morin, the math-
ematician and famous critic of Descartes, argued that this idea is contradictory. Ob-
jection to which Descartes replies by saying that:
You say also that there is a vicious circle in proving effects from a cause, and then 
proving the cause by the same effects. I agree: but I do not agree that it is a circu-
lar to explain effects by a cause, and then prove the cause by the effects; because 
there is a big difference between proving an explaining. I should add that the word 
‘demonstrate’ can be used to signify either, if it is used according to common 
usage and not in the technical philosophical sense. I should add also that there 
is nothing circular in proving a cause by several effects which are independently 
known, and then proving certain other effects from this cause35.
In order to argue against Morin’s objection, Descartes introduces a distinction 
between ‘proving’ and ‘explaining’. Descartes says that ‘to demonstrate’ could either 
mean ‘to prove’ or ‘to explain’, depending on the context in which the term ‘demon-
strate’ is used. The objection of circularity arises when ‘demonstration’ is considered 
a synonymous of ‘proving’, when it must mean ‘explaining’, or when ‘demonstra-
tion’ is considered a synonymous of ‘explaining’, when it must mean ‘proving’. In 
this sense, Descartes accepts that maybe he is responsible for that confusion, because 
he does not warn his reader about the ambivalence of the term ‘demonstration.’ 
Based on the assumption that, depending on the context, it is possible to demon-
strate (in the sense of ‘to explain’) causes from their effects and demonstrate (in the 
sense of ‘to prove’) effects from their causes, Descartes says that “my last conclu-
sions are demonstrated by the first, which are their causes, so the first may in turn 
be demonstrated from the last which are their effects”36. Incorporating Descartes’ 
semantic distinction explicitly, the passage can be rephrased as follows: the last con-
clusions are proven by the first, which are their causes, and the first may be explained 
from the last, which are their effects. On the one hand, when Descartes attempts to 
demonstrate effects from their causes, the term ‘demonstration’ must be taken as 
synonymous of ‘to prove.’ In this sense, scientific explanation could be described as 
deductive, and the role of experience must be considered as complementary. On the 
other hand, when Descartes attempts to ‘demonstrate’ causes from their effects, the 
term ‘demonstration’ must be taken as synonymous of ‘to explain’. This means that 
scientific explanation should be considered as hypothetical-deductive, rather than 
deductive, and, therefore, the role of experience should be considered as necessary. 
35 CSMK: 106; AT II: 197-198.
36 Ibíd.
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Furthermore, Descartes states that “experience renders most of these effects quite 
certain and so the causes from which I deduce them serve not so much to prove them 
as to explain them— indeed it is the causes which are proved by the effects”37.
To explain causes from their effects does not mean that effects will prove causes, 
because, according to Descartes, experimental reasoning cannot reach clear and dis-
tinct perception. From this view, Descartes’ natural philosophy cannot be grounded 
in inductive reasoning, and the claim for including experience in scientific explana-
tion is necessary to support the idea that natural philosophy must constantly decide 
among various hypotheses. This must be taken in to account, considering weak cer-
tainties, given that causes (grounded in clear and distinct certainties) only explain 
natural phenomena from a general point of view.
In the letter quoted above, Descartes rejects Morin’s objection of circularity on 
the basis of distinguishing the words ‘proving’ and ‘explaining’. Descartes is also 
convinced that natural philosophy has to face the challenge of proving hypotheses 
regarding experiments and matching the results of those experiments with physical 
laws. In this sense, based on the idea of explaining causes from their effects, Clarke 
says that rather than formulating different possible explanations, a proper scientific 
explanation must be able to show the specific mechanism that displays how a given 
effect can be deduced from a specific cause38. 
Therefore, Descartes scientific explanation implies two different kinds of expla-
nation working simultaneously. In both cases, the connection between experience 
and merely intellectual perceptions is necessary. Reducing Descartes’ scientific ex-
planation to the radical ‘apriorism’ developed in the First and Second Meditation 
(or even in the fourth part of the Discourse) is inaccurate and ultimately inconsist-
ent with Descartes scientific goal: to explain particular phenomena. Nonetheless, 
it would also be inadequate to describe Descartes’ natural philosophy as merely 
empirical, in spite of Descartes’ avowed interest in experimentation. Maybe Clarke 
is right in saying that Descartes is trying to justify that probabilistic reasoning is 
necessary, in order to develop his physics. However, his effort to read Descartes as 
being an empiricist39 is far from convincing contemporary readers that Descartes is 
focused in founding science in non-intellectual perceptions. To analyze Descartes’ 
scientific explanation and his natural philosophy, following a hypothetical-deductive 
methodology, is arguably the only way to find a balance between intellectual and 
experimental explanations.
VI. Conclusion
 The term ‘experience’ in Descartes’ philosophy is mostly used to explain the role of 
experimentation and common experience in natural philosophy. In early works, such 
as the Regulae, Descartes is interested in discovering the truth regardless from expe-
rience, but, as we have seen, it is impossible to remove experience from Descartes’ 
main concerns in his mature works. However, after the sixth part of the Discourse, 
his interest in experience results from his concern about experiments and scientific 
37 Ibíd.
38 Clarke, D. Descartes’ Philosophy of science, Op. Cit., p.113. 
39 Ibíd., p.2 
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explanation. Hence, the analysis proposed here was focused in showing the role of 
experience in Descartes philosophy, starting from the Discourse and finishing with 
the Principles. Thus, it is impossible to remove experience from Descartes’ main 
concerns, at least in his mature works. 
Considering Descartes’ reply to Morin in particular, it can be said that Descartes 
is trying to combine hypothetical-deductive reasoning with merely deductive con-
siderations regarding experiment results. However, Descartes does not explain how 
deductive reasoning (developed regardless experience) can be related to hypothet-
ical reasoning (based on experimental observations). Clarke says that, despite of 
several similarities with the scholastic view (such as his agreement with the role of 
common experience in natural science), Descartes’ standpoint is oriented towards 
justifying probabilistic, non-metaphysical, reasoning in natural philosophy40. We can 
agree with Clarke up to this point, but that does not force us to follow him in his 
attempt, inspired by Laporte41, to qualify Descartes’s reasoning as inductive; given 
that Descartes does not move away from his intellectual claims, even in physics. 
So, it seems preferable to locate Descartes’ natural philosophy as a transition from a 
scholastic standpoint to a probabilistic-based point of view. For this reason, to char-
acterize Descartes’ philosophy as rationalist or empiricist, based on the importance 
of intellectual perception and experience, can be inaccurate and even misleading. 
Thus, the use of these terms (commonly used to describe not only Descartes’ philos-
ophy but also early modern Western philosophy) will be useful in order to show the 
problematic relationship between experience and reason in Descartes’ works. 
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